OverviewLTCMOptional
TOPIC 2 · OPTIONAL CASE

Long-Term Capital Management"The Enemy Is Us"

How a fund run by two Nobel laureates and the brightest minds on Wall Street earned billions through mathematical arbitrage — and then lost nearly everything in five weeks. Based on Sebastian Mallaby's More Money Than God, Chapter 10.

$125B
Peak Assets
25–27×
Peak Leverage
−92%
1998 Return
$3.6B
Fed-Brokered Bailout
01

Origins

From Salomon Brothers to Greenwich

John Meriwether built a legendary bond trading group at Salomon Brothers in the 1980s. Unlike traditional traders who relied on gut instinct, he hired PhD economists and finance professors — including Robert Merton and Myron Scholes, who would later win the Nobel Prize. By the end of the decade, this small academic unit generated 90% of Salomon's profits.

In 1991, a Treasury bond scandal forced Meriwether to resign. In February 1994, he launched Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in Greenwich, Connecticut — "Salomon without the bullshit." The idea: strip away the overhead of a large bank and concentrate purely on the quantitative trading strategies that had made his team so profitable.

The Core Belief

Markets occasionally misprice nearly identical securities due to temporary distortions — tax rules, liquidity preferences, institutional constraints. These mispricings will inevitably correct. By identifying them mathematically and hedging out all directional risk, LTCM could earn reliable, uncorrelated returns.
🎓
The Team
8 Salomon veterans + Robert Merton + Myron Scholes (Nobel 1997). 165 employees at peak.
📍
Location
600 Steamboat Road, Greenwich CT. Offices added in London and Tokyo.
💰
Launch Capital
$1.25 billion raised from institutional investors. Minimum investment: $10 million, 3-year lockup.
📊
Fee Structure
2% management fee + 25% performance fee — far above the standard 1%/20% hedge fund model.
02

The Strategy

Convergence Arbitrage at Scale

LTCM's core approach was convergence arbitrage — finding two nearly identical securities priced differently, buying the cheap one, shorting the expensive one, and waiting for the gap to close. The profits per trade were tiny, so LTCM used massive leverage to amplify them.

STRATEGY 01
On-the-Run vs Off-the-Run Treasuries

New bonds trade at a liquidity premium over slightly older ones. Both will pay identical cash flows — so the gap must close. Buy the cheap old bond, short the expensive new one.

STRATEGY 02
Italian Bond Arbitrage

Tax rules suppressed foreign demand for Italian bonds, making them cheap. Partner with an Italian bank to bypass the tax, earn a 1% spread. Contributed $600M in LTCM's first two years.

STRATEGY 03
Royal Dutch / Shell Equity

Two listed companies (Dutch and British) representing claims on the same profits — but trading at different prices. Buy the cheap British shares, short the expensive Dutch ones.

STRATEGY 04
Volatility Selling

Sell S&P 500 options at 19% implied volatility — far above the historical 10–13% range. Collect premiums from nervous investors. Morgan Stanley dubbed LTCM 'the central bank of volatility.'

The Leverage Logic

In 1995, LTCM's return on assets was just 2.45% — modest. But leverage transformed that into a 42.8% return on equity. At peak, LTCM held $125 billion in assets on $4.7 billion of capital — a leverage ratio of roughly 27:1. The leverage was considered safe because each trade was hedged: the risk was not the size of the position, but the size of the spread.

Annual Returns: LTCM vs S&P 500

LTCM's returns were uncorrelated with the market — until 1998, when they collapsed catastrophically.

1994 (10mo)1995199619971998-135%-90%-45%0%45%
  • LTCM
  • S&P 500
03

The Collapse

Three Acts of Destruction

Act I — May / June 1998

The IMF bailout of Indonesia faltered, the Suharto regime collapsed, Japan entered recession, and Russia tripled interest rates. Investors fled to U.S. Treasuries, widening the spread between safe and risky assets. LTCM lost 6% in May and 10% in June — far beyond its VaR estimates. The partners trimmed positions and dismissed it as a freak event.

Act II — August 17, 1998: Russia Defaults

Russia defaulted on its debt, triggering a global 'flight to quality' of unprecedented scale. Every single LTCM trade was based on the premise that irrational spreads would converge. Instead, spreads widened violently across every market simultaneously. The on-the-run/off-the-run Treasury spread — which normally moved less than 1 basis point per day — widened by 8 basis points in a single day. LTCM lost $1.9 billion (44% of its capital) in August alone. Their models said this should happen less than once in the lifetime of the universe.

Act III — September 1998: The Death Spiral

Once the market knew LTCM was in trouble, every bank and hedge fund began trading against it. Goldman Sachs, conducting due diligence on a potential rescue, allegedly downloaded LTCM's entire position book — and Goldman's trading desk began selling the same positions, front-running LTCM's inevitable liquidation. Meriwether approached Warren Buffett, Saudi Prince Alwaleed, Michael Dell, and Merrill Lynch — all refused. By mid-September, LTCM was losing $500 million per day. The New York Fed brokered a $3.6 billion bailout by 14 major banks.

Treasury Spread Widening (basis points)

On-the-run vs off-the-run spread — LTCM's core trade — exploded in Aug–Sep 1998.

Jan 98Feb 98Mar 98Apr 98May 98Jun 98Jul 98Aug 98Sep 98Oct 98Nov 98Dec 980bp15bp30bp45bp60bpRussia Default

LTCM Capital Base ($M)

From $4.7B at start of 1998 to under $600M by September — a 87% destruction of capital.

Jan 98Feb 98Mar 98Apr 98May 98Jun 98Jul 98Aug 98Sep 98$0.0B$1.5B$3.0B$4.5B$6.0B
04

The Central Lesson

The Enemy Is Us

The chapter's title comes from the Walt Kelly comic strip character Pogo: "We have met the enemy and he is us." LTCM's very success had created its own destruction.

By being so widely imitated, its trades became monstrously crowded. When the crisis hit, every arbitrageur was a forced seller simultaneously — driving prices further from fair value, making LTCM's losses worse. The Slinky effect had reversed: instead of prices snapping back, they were being pushed further apart.

Eric Rosenfeld, one of the partners, later identified this as "the fund's central error": the failure to anticipate trader-driven correlation. LTCM's models assumed its trades were uncorrelated because they were economically different. But they were all held by the same type of fund — so in a crisis, they all lost money together.

Model Risk

VaR models based on historical data cannot anticipate unprecedented events. LTCM's models said August 1998 losses should occur less than once in the lifetime of the universe.

Trader-Driven Correlation

Diversification failed — not because trades were economically similar, but because they were all held by the same type of fund. In a crisis, all positions lost money simultaneously.

Crowded Trade Risk

LTCM's success attracted imitators. By 1998, every bank that might buy LTCM's positions had already bought them. When LTCM needed to sell, there were no buyers.

Reflexivity

The more LTCM tried to raise capital, the more it signaled distress, the more predators attacked its positions, the more capital it lost. A self-reinforcing death spiral.

LTCM Leverage Ratio Over Time

As capital eroded in 1998, the effective leverage ratio exploded — making every adverse price move more devastating.

Launch 1994End 1994End 1995End 1996End 1997Aug 1998Sep 199835×70×105×140×LeverageCrisis
  • Leverage (×)
05

Pre-Class Assignment

Draft Answers — Click to Expand

These are draft answers grounded strictly in the case material. Question (c) requires your personal opinion — please revise before submitting.

Key Numbers to Remember

$1.25B
Launch Capital
Feb 1994
42.8%
1995 Return
Best year
27:1
Peak Leverage
End of 1997
−44%
August 1998
One month
$3.6B
Fed Bailout
14 banks
165
Employees
At peak